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1 Introduction
When I was a physics student, I often had the impression that I did not re-
ally understand the material that was presented. The reason was that the
presented calculations were claimed to be based on the ’fundamental theory’,
usually quantum mechanics, but many of the steps that were made did not
seem to really follow from the equations of quantum mechanics. These equa-
tions are deterministic, linear in the wave function, and invariant under reversal
of the direction of time. In contrast, the calculations presented in the classes
appeared to involve concepts that are incompatible with these features. Time
reversal symmetry was broken when dealing for instance with the scattering of a
quantum particle at a potential: the incoming particle is assumed to be not af-
fected by the potential, but the outgoing particle is. Chance is introduced when
basing all of statistical physics on probabilities, or when transition probabilities
between quantum states are calculated, as for instance in scattering theory. The
supposedly ’simple’ Hartree-Fock theory, a so-called mean-field theory that is
used for calculating approximately the quantum mechanical ground states of
many-electron atoms, is nonlinear in the wave function. Furthermore, elements
from classical mechanics and quantum mechanics are often mixed, for instance
when describing electrons as balls when explaining the origin of the electric re-
sistance, or when calculating the configuration of molecules by assuming that
the atomic nuclei have well-defined positions in space. Whether on purpose or
unintentionally, many courses and textbooks made us students believe that in
principle everything follows from a set of fundamental laws, but that in prac-
tice it is unconvenient or unfeasable to do the exact calculation, and therefore
approximations, plausible assumptions, intuitive models, and phenomenological
arguments are made. Only years later, I slowly began to understand that my
problems had not primarily been due to a lack of talent and understanding on
my side, but that there are indeed fundamental and interesting issues behind
all these questions, some of which are the subject of lively discussions in the
philosophy of physics.
Probably the most important factor that made me change my views was
becoming a physics professor and teaching these courses myself. In particular
the courses on statistical physics and condensed matter theory showed me that
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even the most advanced textbooks and research articles contain concepts, argu-
ments, and steps that are a far cry from a strict derivation of the phenomena
exclusively from a set of basic axioms or mathematically expressed laws. Look-
ing back to my time as a student, I wish I had been taught about the interesting
philosophical questions surrounding physics. Because we were lacking this infor-
mation, I and probably many of my fellow students thought that physics is the
most fundamental science, and that by learning quantum physics and particle
physics we would learn the laws that rule nature at the most fundamental level.
As a consequence of this experience, I adopted in the meantime the habit of
pointing these philosophical issues out to students when presenting the course
material or when teaching seminars. When writing down the deterministic,
time-symmetric equations of classical mechanics, electrodynamics, or quantum
mechanics, I address the question whether this implies that nature is indeed
deterministic or time-symmetric. When mentioning probabilities in statisti-
cal mechanics, I address the question how this relates to the supposedly more
’fundamental’, deterministic microscopic theories. When presenting the various
models and methods of condensed-matter theory, I discuss how these models
contain a mixture of elements from quantum and classical physics. Further-
more, I now have discussed the issue of emergence and reduction for a couple of
years in a seminar that I teach during the winter semester to master students
of physics.
The following pages will explain in a more detailed manner that condensed
matter physics cannot be fully reduced to the supposedly ’fundamental’ theory,
which is quantum mechanics of 1023 particles. This means that many properties
of condensed-matter systems are strongly emergent. It also means that the
macroscopic properties of condensed matter systems have a top-down causal
influence on their constitutents. In this way my contribution relates to the
overall topic of this book and the workshop from which it results, which is
top-down causation.
The outline of this paper is as follows: First, I will give a series of examples of
condensed-matter systems that show emergent phenomena and that illustrate
the issues to be discussed subsequently. Then, I will define the concepts of
reduction and emergence, with a focus on the distinction between weak and
strong emergence, as they will be used later in the article. Next, using the
texts by three Nobel laureates in condensed matter theory, I will show how
condensed matter research is done in practice, and I will supplement it with
insights from my own field of expertise, which is statistical physics. Based on
all this information, we will then obtain list of reasons for accepting strong
emergence in physics. Finally, I will deal with some widespread objections.
2 Example systems
Solids, liquids and gases are systems of 1023 particles that show many properties
that the particles themselves don’t possess: pressure, temperature, compress-
ibility, electric conductivity, magnetism, specific heat, crystal structure, etc.
It is an important goal of statistical physics and condensed matter theory to
explain or even predict these properties in terms of the constituent atoms or
molecules and their interactions. And these two fields of physics have indeed
been very successful at relating these properties to the microscopic makeup of
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the respective system.
One reason for this success is that these systems can be discussed without
need to refer explicitly to their context. The listed properties are properties of
an equilibrium system. The wider context enters only implicitly as it determines
which objects are present, how they are arranged, and what are the environ-
mental variables, such as temperature or pressure or the applied electrical or
magnetic field.
Other condensed matter systems are open systems or driven systems: they
can show patterns and structures that depend crucially on their being embedded
in a certain context, as they obtain a continuous input of energy and/or matter
from their environment and pass energy and matter to their environment in a
different form. An important example is thermal convection: when a gas or
liquid is heated from below such that it is cooler at the upper surface than at
the lower, the gas or liquid can be set into motion to form of convection rolls
and thus transports heat efficiently from the warm to the cool surface. Such
differences in temperature drive to a considerable part the weather and climate
on earth. In this case, the temperature differences are due to the sun’s radiation
heating the earth surface more at some places than at others. A particularly
fascinating example of patterns in open systems are spiral patterns. They are
for instance observed in the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction, which is an oscillat-
ing chemical reaction that cycles through three different reaction products, with
the presence of one aiding the production of the next one. When put in a petri
dish, one can observe spiral patterns. This pattern persists only for a limited
time unless reaction products are continually removed and reaction educts are
continually added. The most complex open systems are living systems. They
require a continuous supply of resources from which they obtain their energy, for
instance oxygen and food, and they pass the reaction products, such as carbon
dioxide and water, to the environment. More importantly, they communicate
continuously with their environment, obtaining from it cues about danger and
food, and shaping it for instance by building burrows, farming lice, exchang-
ing information with their conspecifics and other species, and by pursuing the
production and survival of their offspring.
Driven systems are also investigated by theoretical physicists, employing the-
ories that refer to the parts of the systems and their interactions, however, such
theories use a different level of description and don’t usually refer to quantum
mechanics. In this article, we will mainly focus on the first class of systems, as
they appear to be less complex and more easily accessible to a description by a
fundamental microscopic theory.
3 Defining reduction and emergence
As already indicated, the natural sciences, in particular physics, work in a re-
ductionist way: they aim at explaining the properties of a system in terms of
its constitutents and their properties, and they are very successful at this en-
deavor. More precisely, physicists perform a theoretical reduction (and not an
ontological reduction), which means that the property that one wants to explain
is obtained mathematically by using elements of a microscopic theory that deals
with the constituents of the system. Thus, for instance, the pressure of a gas is
expressed in terms of the force that the atoms exert on the surface when they
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are reflected from it, and the temperature in terms of the kinetic energy of the
atoms. The electrical resistivity is obtained from a mathematical description of
the collisions of electrons with lattice vibrations and crystal defects. The oscilla-
tions and waves observed in the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction are reproduced
from a set of chemical reaction equations for the concentrations of the molecules
occurring in the system. Even beyond the realm of physics proper this type of
approach is successful: the occurrence of traffic jams can be calculated based on
models for cars that follow simple rules involving preferred velocities and pre-
ferred distances, the dynamics of ecosystems from biological populations feeding
on each other, and stock market crashes from models of interacting agents.
Emergence in a very general sense is the occurrence of properties in a sys-
tem that the constituents don’t have. In the previous section, examples for such
emergent properties were given. So far there is nothing contentious about these
general concepts of emergence and reduction. The discussion starts when one
wants to assess the extent and nature of this reduction or emergence. Broadly
speaking, there are two possible points of view: Either reduction is complete,
at least in principle, and therefore emergence is weak; or reduction is incom-
plete and emergence is strong. Complete reduction means that the property
or phenomenon to be described is completely contained in and implied by the
microscopic theory. Incomplete reduction means that although the microscopic
theory is successfully used, one invokes additional assumptions, approximations,
hypotheses, or principles that are not part of the microscopic theory. Concor-
dantly, weak emergence means that although the system has new properties,
which are the emergent properties, these are fully accounted for by the micro-
scopic theory. Strong emergence, in contrast, means that there is an irreducible,
generically new aspect to the properties of the system as a whole that is not
contained in or implied by the underlying theory. Strong emergence is closely
associated with top-down causation. If higher-level properties are not fully ac-
counted for by the lower-level theory, but if they affect the behavior of the
system, then they also affect the way in which the constituents behave. This
means that there is a top-down causation in addition to bottom-up causation.
The picture underlying these concepts of emergence and reduction is that
of a hierarchy of entities and systems, with the objects of one hierarchical level
being the parts of the objects on the next level. Several such hierarchies can
be constructed. One hierarchy that leads up to human societies is the follow-
ing: Elementary particles – atoms – molecules – cells – individuals – societies.
Another hierachy that stays within the world of physics is this one: Elemen-
tary particles – atoms – solids and fluids – planets and stars – solar systems –
galaxies – universe.
In this article, we will mainly deal with condensed matter systems such
as given in the first group of examples above. This means that we focus on
the relation between the physics of mesoscopic or macroscopic systems and
the relevant microscopic theory, which is a quantum mechanical description of
approximately 1023 atomic nuclei and their surrounding electrons. In terms of
the hierarchy of objects, we discuss the relation between atoms and solids.
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4 Condensed matter research in practice
In the following, I will quote three Nobel Laureates in condensed matter theory
as they explain how research in their field proceeds and how it is related to
the supposedly fundamental quantum theory. All of them present strong argu-
ments against a reductionist view. Nevertheless, two of them make surprisingly
ambivalent statements concerning the nature of reduction.
Since condensed-matter physics often uses methods from statistical mechan-
ics and since statistical mechanics is my field of expertise, I will present ad-
ditional arguments against the reductionist view by explaining how statistical
mechanics relates to quantum mechanics and also to classical mechanics (which
is for historical reasons still often used as a fundamental microscopic theory
when justifying the laws of statistical mechanics).
4.1 Philip Warren Anderson and the topic of symmetry
breaking
In his famous paper ’More is different’ [1], Anderson begins with the following
sentences:
The reductionist hypothesis may still be a topic for controversy
among philosophers, but among the great majority of active sci-
entists, I think it is accepted without question. The workings of
our minds and bodies, and of all the animate or inanimate matter of
which we have any detailed knowlddge, are assumed to be controlled
by the same set of fundamental laws.
Somewhat further on, he explains:
(...) the reductionist hypothesis does not by any means imply a
’constructionist’ one: The ability to reduce everything to simple
fundamental laws does not imply the possibility to start from those
laws and reconstruct the universe. (..) At each level of complexity
entirely new properties appear, and the understanding of the new
behaviors requires research which I think is as fundamental in its
nature as any other.
Then he gives the reason why this is so: It is because of symmetry breaking. The
microscopic theory is invariant under spatial translation or rotation and thus
for instance forbids the occurence of nonzero electrical dipole moments or of
crystal lattices. This is because in an electrical dipole the negative charges have
a different center than the positive charges, which means that a particular direc-
tion – that in which the negative charges are shifted – is singled out. Similarly,
the atoms on a lattice have preferred positions, and the lattice has main axes
that point in specific directions. When a direction is singled out, rotational
symmetry, which treats all directions equally, is broken. When lattice posi-
tions are singled out, translational symmetry, which treats all positions equally,
is broken. Another important case of symmetry breaking is the handedness of
many biological molecules. This is an example that Anderson focuses on: While
very small molecules, such as ammonia, can tunnel between the two tetrahedral
configurations with a high frequency, and thus have on average zero electrical
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dipole moment, larger molecules, such as sugar, cannot tunnel during any rea-
sonable time period. Symmetry breaking is very important in condensed matter
physics: When the energetically favored state is a symmetry-broken state, the
system chooses spontaneously one of these possible states, all of which have the
same energy, as is analyzed in depth in the theory of phase transitions. This is
relevant to phenomena such as superconductivity, magnetism, and superfluidity.
Anderson’s conclusion is that because of symmetry breaking the whole becomes
different from the sum of its parts.
There is an interesting dichotomy in this article: on the one hand, Anderson
emphasizes more than once that he accepts reductionism (in the sense that ’ev-
erything obeys the same fundamental laws’), on the other hand he gives great
arguments why reductionism does not work. Even more, he admits that there
is a logical contradiction between the laws of quantum mechanics and the fact
the molecules have symmetry-breaking structures. Since he wrote his article,
there has been a lot of progress in this field, and several authors have pointed
out that in fact the problems of symmetry breaking and of molecular struc-
ture are closely related to the problems of interpreting the quantum mechanical
measurement process and of understanding the relation between quantum me-
chanics and classical mechanics [2, 3, 4]. We will address this problem further
below.
4.2 Robert Laughlin and higher-order principles
In his often-cited article with Pines “The Theory of Everything” [5], and also
in his popular-science book “A different universe” [6] Laughlin expresses a sim-
ilar view to Anderson. The authors of [5] label the Schro¨dinger equation that
describes all the electrons and nuclei of a system as the “Theory of Everything”
for condensed-matter physics and explain:
We know that this equation is correct because it has been solved ac-
curately for small numbers of particles and found to agree in minute
detail with experiment. However, it cannot be solved accurately
when the number of particles exceeds about 10. No computer (...)
that will ever exist can break this barrier because there is a catas-
trophy of dimension. (....) We have succeeded in reducing all of
ordinary physical behavior to a simple, correct Theory of Every-
thing only to discover that it has revealed exactly nothing about
many things of great importance.
Just as Anderson, the authors first appear to commit to reductionism, and
then explain why it is of no use for many important problems in condensed
matter theory. Confusingly, they do not clarify what they mean by “correct”
or “accurate”; they cannot possibly mean that the theory is exact as they write
themselves that it neglects several effects (such as the coupling to photons).
Apparently they think that these effects are unimportant even when dealing
with solids consisting of 1023 atoms.
Their arguments why the “Theory of Everything” is useless for condensed
matter theory include symmetry breaking, but are more general: In his book,
Laughlin calls the principles determining many emergent features ’Higher-order
principles’ (HOPs). In the article, he and Pines explain it as follows:
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Experiments of this kind (i.e., condensed-matter experiments that
allow us to measure the natural constants with extremely high pre-
cision) work because there are higher organizing principles in nature
that make them work. The Josephson quantum1 is exact because of
the principle of continuous symmetry breaking. The quantum Hall
effect 2 is exact because of localization. (....) Both are transcendent,
in that they would continue to be true and to lead to exact results
even if the Theory of Everything was changed.
They go on to explain that “for at least some fundamental things in nature the
Theory of Everything is irrelevant.” They introduce the concept of a quantum
protectorate,
a stable state of matter whose generic low-energy properties are de-
termined by a higher organizing principle and nothing else. (...) The
low-energy excited quantum states of these systems are particles in
exactly the same sense that the electron in the vacuum of quantum
electrodynamics is a particle. (...) The nature of the underlying
theory is unknowable until one raises the energy scale sufficiently to
escape protection.
In fact, even though they do not mention this, the Theory of Everything, i.e.,
the many-particle Schro¨dinger equation, is also such a quantum protectorate,
valid at low energies, obtained from general considerations, and independent of
more microscopic theories, such as quantum field theories or string theories.
All this raises the question whether it is logically consistent to claim that a
system is determined by a micropscopic law and to claim simultaneously that
this law is irrelevant since higher-order principles govern the behavior of the
system. This is in my view the most interesting question raised by the article,
but the authors don’t address it. We will come back to this question later. While
the examples chosen by Anderson were taken mainly from the room-temperature
classical world, the examples used by Laughlin and Pines are mainly quantum
phenomena. Therefore, the issue now is not primarily the relation between
the quantum description and the classical description, but the relation between
different quantum descriptions (the microscopic one and the one based on HOPs)
of the same system.
4.3 Anthony Leggett and the quantum-classical transition
In his article “On the nature of research in condensed-state physics” [7], Leggett
writes
No significant advance in the theory of matter in bulk has ever come
about through derivation from microscopic principles. (...) I would
1The Josephson quantum is due to the fact that magnetic flux surrounded by a super-
conducting current can only be an integer multiple of a basic flux unit. This is because the
magnetic flux affects the phase of the superconducting wave function, but the wave function
must have a again the same phase after going around the flux line once.
2The Hall effect gives rise to a transverse electric field in a two-dimensional conductor to
which a magnetic field is applied that is perpendicular to the current. The Hall resistance
is the ratio of the transverse electrical field to the electrical current, and it takes quantized
values when the material is cooled down sufficiently. The explanation of this effect involves
considerations about the topology of the wave function.
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confidently argue further that it is in principle and forever impossible
to carry out such a derivation. (...) The so-called derivations of the
results of solid state physics from microscopic principles alone are
almost all bogus, if ’derivation’ is meant to have anything like its
usual sense.
So he agrees with Anderson and Laughlin that the microscopic theory is useless
for deriving the properties of solids. He illustrates this by using the example of
Ohm’s law, i.e. the law for the electrical resistance:
Consider as elementary a principle as Ohm’s law. As far as I know,
no-one has ever come even remotely within reach of deriving Ohm’s
law from microscopic principles without a whole host of auxiliary
assumptions (’physical approximations’), which one almost certainly
would not have thought of making unless one knew in advance the
result one wanted to get, (and some of which may be regarded as
essentially begging the question). This situation is fairly typical:
once you have reason to believe that a certain kind of model or
theory will actually work at the macroscopic or intermediate level,
then it is sometimes possible to show that you can ’derive’ it from
microscopic theory, in the sense that you may be able to find the
auxiliary assumptions or approximations you have to make to lead
to the result you want.
But if auxiliary assumptions and approximations are involved in the derivation
of Ohm’s law, the theory or even the phenomenon might not be contained in
the microscopic theory. This becomes even clearer in the next paragraph:
But you can practically never justify these auxiliary assumptions,
and the whole process is highly dangerous anyway: very often you
find that what you thought you had ’proved’ comes unstuck experi-
mentally (for instance, you ’prove’ Ohm’s law quite generally only to
discover that superconductors don’t obey it) and when you go back
to your proof you discover as often as not that you had implicitly
slipped in an assumption that begs the whole question. (...)
This experience makes him skeptical with respect to the validity of his calcula-
tions:
Incidentally, as a psychological fact, it does occasionally happen that
one is led to a new model by a microscopic calculation. But in
that case one certainly doesn’t believe the model because of the
calculation: on the contrary, in my experience at least one disbelieves
or distrusts the calculation unless and until one has a flash of insight
and sees the result in terms of a model.
Now comes the most interesting part about the nature of theories in condensed-
matter physics:
I claim then that the important advances in macroscopic physics
come essentially in the construction of models at an intermediate or
macroscopic level, and that these are logically (and psychologically)
independent of microscopic physics. Examples of the kind of models
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I have in mind which may be familiar to some readers include the
Debye model of a crystalline solid, the idea of a quasiparticle, the
Ising or Heisenberg picture of a magnetic material, the two-fluid
model of liquid helium, London’s approach to superconductivity (...)
In some cases these models may be plausibly represented as ’based
on’ microscopic physics, in the sense that they can be described as
making assumptions about microscopic entities (e.g. ’the atoms are
arranged in a regular lattice’), but in other cases (such as the two-
fluid model) they are independent even in this sense. What all have
in common is that they can serve as some kind of concrete picture,
or metaphor, which can guide our thinking about the subject in
question. And they guide it in their own right, and not because
they are a sort of crude shorthand for some underlying mathematics
derived from ’basic principles.’
This is reminiscent of the higher-order principles mentioned by Laughlin, but is
more general: One needs to identify the important features that are responsible
for the phenomenon to be explained. These features are discovered by an in-
tuitive understanding of the system, often in terms of pictures and metaphors.
They form the basis of a model, which in turn is the basis of an effective mathe-
matical description. Further on, he explains that these models in fact often are
incompatible with the microscopic theory:
(...) not only is there no good reason to believe that all the properties
of condensed-matter systems are simply consequences of the proper-
ties of their atomic-level constituents, but that there is a very good
reason not to believe it. (...) Indeed, I would be perfectly happy to
share the conventional reductionist prejudice were it not for a single
fact (...) which is so overwhelming in its implications that it forces
us to challenge even what we might think of as the most basic com-
mon sense. This fact is the existence of the quantum measurement
paradox.(...) this argument implies that quantum mechanics, of its
nature, cannot give a complete account of all the properties of the
world at the macroscopic level. (...) It follows that somewhere along
the line from the atom to human consciousness quantum mechanics
must break down.
I fully agree with his characterization of how condensed matter physics is done
in practice and with his diagnosis that there must be limits to the validity of
quantum mechanics. In fact, together with George Ellis, I have written a paper
that interprets the quantum measurement process in terms of top-down effects
from the classical world on the quantum world [8].
4.4 Statistical physics and the concept of probabilities
After these three examples from solid-state physics, I want to conclude this sec-
tion with an example from my own field, which is statistical mechanics. Statisti-
cal mechanics does not deal with a particular system, but provides a framework
for calculating properties of systems of 1023 particles at finite temperature, be
they solids, liquids, or gases. Condensed matter theory often uses concepts and
calculations taken from statistical mechanics, for instance when calculating the
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specific heat of a system, the phase transition between a paramagnet and a
ferromagnet, or the conditions (temperature, magnetic field, or size of electrical
current) that destroy superconductivity. This means that one does not use the
supposedly ’fundamental’ theory but a theory that brings with it new concepts.
The basic concept of statistical mechanics is that of the probability of a state
of a system or a subpart of the system. For instance, a fundamental theorem of
statistical mechanics, from which almost everything else can be derived, is that
in an isolated system in equilibrium all states that are accessible to a system oc-
cur with the same probability. Such an equilibrium state has maximum entropy,
and therefore this theorem is closely related to the second law of thermodynam-
ics, which states that entropy increases in a closed system until the equilibrium
state is reached. Part of the textbooks of statistical mechanics and articles of the
foundations of statistical physics aim at deriving these probabilistic rules from
a microscopic deterministic theory, either classical mechanics (where the atoms
of a gas are treated as little hard balls) or quantum mechanics. A close look
at these derivations, however, reveals that they in fact always put in by hand
what they want to get out: randomness. The initial state of the system must be
a ’random’ state among all those that cannot be distinguished from each other
when specifying them only with finite precision. The apparent randomness in
the future time evolution then follows from this hidden, unperceivable initial
randomness. This means that the randomness of statistical mechanics is not
reduced to a deterministic ’fundamental’ theory, but it is only moved back to
the initial conditions and hidden there. Of course, a truly deterministic world
would not leave us the freedom to say that the precise initial state does not
matter because the real one can be any of them. The initial state would be the
state it is and not care about our ingnorance of finer details. It is amazing that
nature conforms to our ignorance and behaves as if there was nothing special to
the initial state that would later lead to surprising effects in the time evolution.
The natural conclusion, which however goes against the reductionist agenda,
woud be to say that the mathematical concept of infinite precision underlying
the equations of the ’fundamental’ theories has no support from empirical sci-
ence. In fact, when there are no specific top-down effects since the system is
isolated, the system becomes maximally indifferent as to the state in which it
tends to be. This is what the second law of thermodynamics states. This topic
is discussed in more detail in publications by Nicolas Gisin [9, 10] and by myself
[11, 12].
Interestingly, there is a close relation between the quantum measurement
problem and the problem of relating statistical mechanics to quantum mechan-
ics: quantum measurement and statistical mechanics both involve probabilities
and irreversibility. Both deal with systems of a macroscopic number of parti-
cles (in the case of quantum measurement this is the measurement apparatus).
Concordantly, the theories dealing with the two problems involve similar ideas
and types of calculations: they are based on decoherence theory which explains
why quantum mechanical superpositions vanish when a quantum particle inter-
acts with a macroscopic number of other particles. These calculations – not
surprisingly – again need to invoke random initial states. In contrast to theo-
ries that ’derive’ statistical mechanics from classical mechanics, these random
initial states are however not sufficient in order to ’derive’ statistical mechanics
from quantum mechanics, because the calculations give all possible stochastic
trajectories simultaneously instead of picking one of them for each realization.
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So we arrive again at the point emphasized by A. Leggett: Quantum mechanics
is not consistent with physics of macroscopic, finite-temperature objects. This
means that there must be limits of validity to quantum mechanics.
5 Strong arguments for strong emergence in physics
5.1 A full reduction to a microscopic theory cannot be
done
The foregoing quotations and discussions have made clear that a full reduction
is never done in practice, and that it is impossible for several reasons. The more
trivial reason is limited computing power, not just at the present time but for
all future since the calculation of the time evolution of the quantum state of
as few as 1000 particles would require more information than contained in the
universe. This means that the belief in full reduction is a metaphysical belief,
as it can never, even in principle be tested. In contrast, physics is an empirical
science rooted in what can be measured and observed.
But beyond this, I think there are good reasons why reductionism even when
taken as a metaphysical belief is wrong. As most clearly stated by A. Leggett,
there is a logical incompatibility between quantum mechanics, which leads to
superposition of macroscopic objects being in different locations, and the obser-
vation that macroscopic objects are localized in space.
It is my impression that in fact all the effective theories and models and
approximations made in order to obtain the properties of macroscopic systems,
involve assumptions and steps that are in contradiction with the supposedly fun-
damental theory. For instance, the derivations of the phonon (lattice vibration)
spectrum of solids starts by separating the equation for the electrons from that
for the nuclei by using the so-called Born-Oppenheimer approximation. This
approximation is in fact a mixture of quantum theory and classical theory, as it
assumes that the atomic nuclei are localized in space and not in superpositions
of different locations. It is also the basis of quantum chemistry and the widely-
used density functional theory. A nice discussion of this can be found in the
book [3]. Similarly, other theories in condensed matter make assumptions and
approximations that deviate from the linear, deterministic, microscopic Theory
of Everything. It appears to me that they all put in contextual information that
is not intrinsic to the Theory of Everything and that contains elements from
classical physics and oftentimes also of statistical physics.
And there are many more reasons why full reductionism is wrong, as listed
in the following subsections.
5.2 The parts have never existed without the whole
The mental picture that many people have when they think of emergence is that
there are first the parts, and then they get together and form the whole. But this
picture is only half the truth. These parts would not be there without a larger
context that permits their existence and determines their properties. Which
types of elementary particles exist in the universe depends on the properties of
the quantum vacuum, namely its symmetries and degrees of freedom. Whether
these particles can combine to create larger objects, is again determined by
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the context: In the early universe, the temperature and density of the universe
determined which types of objects existed in it: quarks and gluons, or nuclei
and electrons, or atoms and radiation, or stars and galaxies and planets.
On smaller scales, one observes the same extent of context dependence, and
many examples are listed in the book by G. Ellis [13]: The lifetime of a neutron
depends on whether it is a free particle or part of a nucleus. In a crystal,
the presence of the crystal structure permits the existence of phonons, and the
symmetries of the crystal determine their properties. The mass of an electron
depends on the band structure of the metal in which is is. Whether a substance
is liquid or solid depends on the environmental conditions, such as temperature
and pressure.
5.3 The laws of physics are not exact
Full reductionism could only be correct if the supposedly fundamental laws were
extremely accurate. Otherwise, even minute imprecisions could become magni-
fied in macroscopic system to the extent that the fundamental theory cannot
predict correctly the properties of the macroscopic system. But we know that
our present theories are not fully exact: They are idealizations that leave aside
many influences that affect a system. Newtonian mechanics, for instance, ig-
nores the effect of friction, or includes it in a simple way, which is neither
exact nor derived from a microscopic theory. A large part of thermodynamics
is based on local equilibrium, which is not an exact but only an approximate
description. Quantum field theory is burdened with exactly the same problems
as nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, namely the discrepancy between a uni-
tary, deterministic time evolution applied after preparation of the initial state
and before measurement of the final state, and the probabilities and nonlin-
ear expressions featuring in calculations of cross sections and transition rates.
Furthermore, it could not yet be harmonized with Einstein’s theory of general
relativity, which describes gravity.
Batterman argues convincingly that physics theories are asymptotic theories
that become exact only in an asymptotic limit where a quantity goes to zero or
infinity [14]. Newtonian mechanics is a good example of how the applicability of
a theory depends on certain quantities being small or large: The velocity of light
must be large compared to the velocities of the considered objects (otherwise
one needs to use the theory of special relativity), energies must be so large that
quantum effects can be ignored (otherwise one needs quantum mechanics), and
distances must be small compared to cosmic distances on which the curvature of
space is felt (otherwise one needs general relativity). In earlier times, there was
a widespread belief that Newtonian mechanics is an exact theory, ony to realize
in the last century that on all those scales that could not be explored before
(such as the very small, the very large, and the very fast) Newtonian mechanics
becomes invalid, and that it is a very good approximation, but not exact, on
those scales that had been explored. We can expect that our present theories
will also turn out to become inappropriate when new parameter ranges, which
we could not explore previously, become accessible to experiments. In fact, it
appears impossible to have exact, comprehensive microscopic laws that govern
everything that happens, and to have at the same time a complete insensitive-
ness to these microscopic laws in systems that are determined by higher-order
principles.
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5.4 The microscopic world is not deterministic
One of the main shocks caused by quantum mechanics is the insight that the
microscopic nature is fundamentally indeterministic, as for instance visible in
radioactive decay where nothing in the state of an atom allows one to predict
when it will decay. Only the half life can be known and be calculated from a
microscopic theory. The same hold for the quantum-mechanical measurement
process, where the experiment gives one of the possible outcomes with a prob-
ability that can be calculated using the rules of quantum mechanics, but the
process itself is stochastic with nothing in the initial state determining which of
the outcomes will be observed.
In order for full reductionism to hold, the microscopic theory must be de-
terministic. Only then does the microscopic theory determine everything that
happens. Otherwise the microscopic theory can at best give probabilities for
the different possible events. When dealing with a system of many particles,
one likely outcome of such stochastic dynamics is ergodicity, where the system
goes to an equilibrium state that is characterized by a stationary probability
distribution. This is what happens for instance when a thermodynamic sys-
tem such as a gas reaches its equilibrium state, which has maximum entropy.
The macroscopic state variables characterizing this equilibrium state, such as
volume or pressure, are independent of the initial microscopic state and are
essentially determined by the constraints imposed from the outside. Thermo-
dynamic systems are in fact a nice example for top-down causation, as they do
essentially nothing else but to adjust to whatever state is imposed on them by
manipulations from the outside, such as volume change or energy input.
But even when chance does not lead to ergodicity, top-down causation is
involved. When a quantum measurement event happens, the measurement ap-
paratus determines the possible types of measurement outcomes (for instance
whether the z component or the x component of the spin is measured). When
an excited atom goes to its ground state by emitting a photon, it can do so
only because the surrounding medium, the quantum vacuum, can take up that
photon. When the atom is enclosed in a small cavity the size of which is not
a multiple of the photon wavelength, the photon cannot be emitted. It thus
appears that all instances of quantum chance are in fact strongly dependent on
top-down causation. A quantum object by itself, when it is carefully isolated
from interacting with the rest of the world, evolves according to the ’fundamen-
tal’, deterministic, and linear quantum mechanical equations.
Karl Popper made the interesting suggestion that chance at the lower level
is necessary for top-down causation from the higher level [15], and he has been
criticized for it [16]. However, I think that he is right. Only when the entities
at the lower level are not fully controlled by the microscopic laws can they
respond to the higher level. It is often argued that random changes are as little
susceptible to top-down effects as are deterministic changes. But this is based
on the wrong premise that stochasticity is an intrinsic property of the lower-level
system, while it arises in fact from the interaction of the lower-level constituents
with the larger context.
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5.5 Emergent properties are insensitive to microscopic de-
tails
As mentioned above in Sec. 4.2, Laughlin has emphasized a lot that emer-
gent properties are insensitive to microscopic details. It is the higher-order
principles that determine the behavior of the systems he discusses. There are
indeed many examples where systems that are microscopically different show
the same macroscopic behavior and are described by the same mathematical
theory. For instance, the phase transition from a paramagnet to a ferromagnet
below the Curie temperature is described by the same mathematics as the Higgs
mechanism that can successfully explain how particles obtain their mass. Fur-
thermore, within one type of systems, for instance a ferromagnet made of iron,
the mathematical description in the form of macroscopic or effective variables
is independent of the precise microscopic arrangement of atoms and defects.
There exist many microscopic realizations of the same macroscopic state. This
is also emphasized in the book by George Ellis when he mentions the concept
of ’multiple realizability’ of a macroscopic state by microscopic states. When
additionally the time evolution can be expressed in terms of the macroscopic
variables alone, this means that the causal processes can be described on the
level of the macrostate. A natural conclusion is that in such cases causal pro-
cesses do indeed occur at the level of the macrostates and that the microstates
merely adjust to the constraints imposed by the macrostate.
5.6 Many systems are inseparable from their environment
So far, we have mainly addressed equilibrium systems, which can be cut off from
their environment without losing their properties. In fact, this is an approximate
statement, as no system can be completely cut off from the environment; the
best one can do is putting a system into a closed box or lab with no directed
input or output of energy or matter. The typical solid-state systems discussed by
the above-cited Nobel Laureates remain what they are under such conditions, at
least on time scales relevant for experiments. On the very long run, they will be
changed by surface reactions, by radioactive radiation, and ultimately by the sun
turning into a red giant and burning everything on earth. In contrast to these
relatively stable systems, open (or dissipative) systems require an ongoing input
and output of energy and/or matter in order to remain what they are. We have
given in Section 2 the examples of convection patterns, oscillating reactions, and
living organisms. For these systems, the idea that they are determined by their
parts and the interactions of their parts, is completely wrong, as they are what
they are only in contact with their environment: Convection patterns require
an input of heat at one end and a cooling surface at the other end; oscillating
reaction can only be sustained when certain reactants are continually supplied
and certain reaction products removed; living beings need to breathe and feed,
and they respond in a complex way to cues from their environment. Since all
these systems exist only due to being continually sustained by their environment,
it is completely wrong to think of them merely in terms of their parts and the
interactions of their parts. The emergent features of these systems are therefore
clear-cut cases of top-down causation.
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6 Answers to objections
When discussing the issue of strong emergence in physics, a variety of objections
are being made, which shall be dealt with in the following.
6.1 We will find a more fundamental theory
Quite a few scientists hope that even if our present microscopic theories are not
yet the final, correct theories, the progress of physics will ultimately lead to such
final theories.
If such theories will ever be found, they must achieve a lot: They must solve
the quantum measurement problem, and they must also establish a relation
between general relativity and quantum physics. In the light of the arguments
presented in this article, it seems impossbile that such a theory exists. The top-
down effects of the larger, macroscopic context on the microscopic constituents
cannot be captured by a purely microscopic theory.
Some people argue that even if the ultimate theory might be unknowable,
nature cans nevertheless be governed by basic laws which are known to us only
in approximate versions. This is a valid philosophical position, but it appears to
be rooted more in a metaphysical commitment than in emiprical evidence. This
commitment is to physicalism and to causal closure. Both are very restrictive
assumptions that can be doubted on philosophical grounds. The strongest argu-
ments against physicalism are based on human consciousness, and are brought
forward by authors such as Brigitte Falkenburg [17], Thomas Nagel [18], or
Markus Grbriel [19]. All the arguments brought forward by George Ellis in
favor of top-down causation are also arguments against causal closure. These
arguments show that material systems are susceptible even to non-material in-
fluences such as goals, ideas, or man-made conventions.
6.2 You argue from our lack of knowledge, this is danger-
ous
In the 19th and early 20th centure, the British emergentists argued in favor
of strong emergence based on chemistry and biology [20, 16]. They could not
imagine that chemistry of biology obeys the laws of physics, and they assumed
that complex objects are subject to different laws. But after the successes of
quantum chemistry at explaining the periodic table and calculating molecular
structures, and the success of biology at reducing inheritance to the properties
of the DNA molecule, these emergentist positions came in discredit. By analogy,
those who hold to strong emergentist views, are told that progress of science
will probably prove them wrong. If we cannot explain a macroscopic feature in
terms of a microscopic theory today, it might become possible in the future.
However, the arguments presented in this article are not arguments from
ignorance, but from the very nature of the systems under study. Even the
claimed reduction of chemistry or biology to (quantum) physics is incomplete.
It is a partial reduction that invokes a collection of models and arguments that
includes features from the quantum world as well as from the classical world, as
explained in Sec. 5.1. In particular life is so dependent on its environment that
the reductionist enterprise is doomed to failure on principal grounds.
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6.3 There are fully reductionist explanations for the quantum-
classical transition and the second law of thermody-
namics
This is an expert discussion that goes into the details of the theories offered.
As I have tried to convey above, all these theories need to invoke additional
concepts beyond the ’fundamental’ Theory of Everything. In one form or an-
other, they all rely on some type of randomness of initial states or environmental
states. Furtheremore, since quantum mechanics is a linear theory, one cannot
avoid the resulting superpositions of macroscopic states. Pointing out that these
superpositions can look like a classical combination of the different possible out-
comes with their associated probabilities does not fully solve the problem, as
nature realizes in each instance only one of the possible outcomes. Of course,
there are interpretations of quantum mechanics that deal with this issue (such
as the many-worlds interpretation, the statistical interpretation, consistent his-
tories, relational interpretation), but all of them give up on the goal of science
of accounting for an objective, observer-independent reality with its contingent,
particular history. I am not willing to abandon this goal, and I think that aban-
doning this goals hampers the progress of science and distracts from the open
problems that await solutions.
6.4 All supposed top-down effects can equally well be
expressed in terms of a microscopic theory
The idea behind this objection is that the context that produces the top-down
effects is itself composed of atoms and can be described by a microscopic theory.
Instead of having the description in terms of a system and a context, one could
describe both system and context microscopically.
However, apart from being impossible in practice, there are several reasons
why this is not possible in principle: First, there is no isolated system, since
every system emits thermal radiation to the environment, which in turn passes
it on to open space. Furthermore, every system is exposed to the influence of
gravitational forces, which cannot be shielded by any means. Third, having a
closed system leads again to all the problems related to interpreting quantum
mechanics.
Some authors hold that the universe as a whole is a closed system and can
therefore be described by a microscopic theory for all its particles and their
interactions. However, the driving force behind everything that happens in the
universe is the expansion of the universe, starting from a very special initial
state. Neither the initial state, nor the expansion results from the interaction
of the particles, and therefore the claim that the universe is determined by its
parts and their interactions is wrong.
7 Conclusion
To conclude, I see many reasons to reject the view that the world of physics
is causally closed with everything being determined bottom-up by fundamental
microscopic laws. As stated in the book by George Ellis: The lower (micro-
scopic) level enables everything and underlies everything, but does not deter-
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mine everything. The higher hierarchical levels have an important say at what
happens in nature. Anthony Leggett writes in his above-cited article that the
non-reductionist view is a minority view among professional physicists. In fact,
I am not so sure about this. Clearly, the majority of people who write and talk
on such foundational topics, have a more-or-less reductionist view. However,
when I talk to colleagues it appears to me that many of them are aware that
the world described by physics is not a monolithic block that is controled by
a small set of rules. Maybe that those people who have not simple clear view
but think that physics is more complex usually don’t write papers on this topic.
This is one of the reasons why I decided to write this paper.
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